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an
for grand

was

cases arising out of Valley County and Ada
remained
case,

Mr. Brand

custody in the Ada County Jail until his sentencing for grand theft in this
was remanded to the custody of the Department of Correction.

time

then moved for credit for time served from the time he was served with the
in this case to the time he was sentenced in this case, totaling 190 days.
his motion. Mr. Brand now

from the district court's

on his motion. He argues that the plain language of Idaho's credit for time served
statute

credit for his prejudgment incarceration despite his concurrent
charges.

On June 30,
in
the same
November

201

(R., pp.8-9.) Mr.

An
with the

warrant was
warrant on

(R., p.9.) At the time of service, Mr. Brand was in custody in the Ada
offenses

County,

both for possession of a controlled substance. (Presentence Investigation Report
("PSl"), 2 pp.10, 12, 18, 23; Tr., p.8, L.15-p.9, L.3, p.13, Ls.10-21.) In the Valley County

1 Similar issues are raised in State v. Nall, Supreme Court Docket No. 43442, and in
State v. Martin, Supreme Court Docket No. 43297.
2 Citations to the PSI refer to the electronic document containing the confidential
exhibits titled "Brand 43441 psi."
1

201

on

same

3

1

as

4, 2014. (PSI, pp.9, 10, 12, 18.) Then, on November 5, 2014, Mr. Brand was
for grand theft, and bond was reduced from $200,000 to $10,000. (R., pp.9,
11.) On November 7, 2014, Mr. Brand was sentenced in the Ada County possession
case

seven years, with two years fixed. (PSI, p.9, 10, 12, 18.) After sentencing in the

Ada County possession case, Mr. Brand remained in custody in the Ada County Jail
until his sentencing for the instant offense of grand theft. (See R., pp.11, 19-20, 29-30,
31, 32, 33, 39-40, 46-47, 57, 61, 70; PSI, p.12.)
On March 6, 2015, Mr. Brand waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate
bound him over to district court (R., pp.55-56, 57.) The State filed an Information
with grand theft. (R., pp.58-59.) On March 24, 2015, Mr. Brand pied

charging
guilty as

. (R., pp.61, 73.)
years,

12,

him to
, pp.70, 73-76.) The district

two years fixed, for

entered a Judgment of Conviction and Commitment on May 14, 2015. (R., pp.7376.) In the judgment, the district court gave Mr. Brand four days for credit for time

served. 4 (R., p.74.)

Specifically, on May 22, 2014, Mr. Brand was sentenced to a period of retained
jurisdiction for possession in the Valley County case. (PSI, pp.9, 10, 12, 18.) On
October 23, 2014, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and executed Mr. Brand's
sentence in the Valley County case. (PSI, pp.10, 12, 18.) The underlying sentence,
however, is unclear from the record. (See PSI, pp.10, 12, 18.) In this respect, the record
provides only that Mr. Brand's current parole eligibility date for both the Valley County
case and Ada County possession case was September 6, 2017, with a final discharge
date of March 5, 2028. (PSI, p.12.)
4 At the sentencing hearing, the district court discusses its award of four days of credit.
Counsel has listened to the audio recording of this hearing. A transcript of this hearing
3

2

.)

a

1

... on
he was

," a

hearing on the motion on June

a

190 days. (R., p.79.)
2015. 5 (R., p.82.) According to the minutes

the

hearing, the district court and Mr. Brand's counsel had a "[d]iscussion" regarding the
motion. (R., p.82.) The district court

time served. (R., p.84;

another hearing for July 21, 2015. (R., p.82.) At

p.13, L.25-p.14,

, p.12,

1.) The district court

reasoned:
[l]f you are in custody on new charges and those charges lead to a
probation violation, you get credit on the probation violation for the time
you spent in custody. 6 But if you are in custody on separate charges and
then unrelated charges are filed
you're in custody, you don't get credit
for that time because you're not
held on the new charges, you're
being held on the original charges.

was not requested, however, because
issue is reviewed de novo and thus the
district court's reasoning behind its
of credit is not
for
5 The Supreme Court denied Mr. Brand's motion to augment the record with a transcript
this hearing. See State v. Brand, Supreme Court Docket No. 43441, Order Denying
Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated November 9, 2015.
6 Idaho Code section 19-2603 governs the determination of credit for time served
following a probation violation:

The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service
of a bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to
believe the defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time
served following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227,
Idaho Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under the
withheld judgment or suspended sentence.
I.C. § 19-2603 (emphasis added). "Under the plain terms of I.C. § 19-2603, a defendant
is entitled to credit for time served from service of a bench warrant for a probation
violation." State v. Bitkoff, 157 Idaho 410,413 (Ct. App. 2014)
3

12,

1.)

r.

was

.)

on July 23, 201
from

d

court's

(R.,

87-88.)

(R.,

4

Mr.

filed a

of

5

Introduction
Following the service of an arrest

for grand theft,

Brand was

incarcerated in county jail for the entirety of the grand theft criminal proceedings. He
was also incarcerated for separate offenses arising out of Valley and Ada County.
the concurrent incarceration for separate offenses, Mr. Brand remained in
custody for grand theft until the entry of a judgment of conviction. Thus, after Mr. Brand
was served with the arrest warrant for grand theft, his incarceration was "for the offense
for which the judgment of conviction was entered." LC. § 18-309(1). Pursuant to this
plain, unambiguous language of I.C. § 18-309(1 ), the district court was required to give
Mr. Brand contends that

Brand credit for his prejudgment time
to do so was contrary to l.

district

§ 18-309( 1) and in error.

Standard Of Review
Court exercises "free review over statutory interpretation because it is a
question

C.

law." State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3 (2015).

As An Unambiguous Statute, The Plain Language Of I.C. § 18-309 Mandates
Credit For Prejudgment Time Served For An Offense Despite Concurrent
Incarcerations For Other Offenses Or Cases
Idaho Code section 18-309 governs the receipt of credit for prejudgment time

served. Owens, 158 Idaho at 3. It provides in relevant part: "In computing the term of
imprisonment, the person against whom the judgment was entered, shall receive credit
in the judgment for any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such
6

was

was
§ 1
was

his

" Owens, 158

3

Law v. Rasmussen, 1

(1983)).
The plain language of I.C. § 18-309(1) is unambiguous. Owens, 158 Idaho at
Court

"Statutory interpretation begins with

statute's plain language." Id. at 3.

"considers the statute as a

gives words their plain, usual, and ordinary

meanings." Id. "When the statute's language is unambiguous, the legislature's clearly
intent must be given

and [the Court does] not

to go beyond the

statute's plain language to consider other rules of statutory construction." Id. This case
involves the interpretation of the second phrase of I.C. § 18-309(1): "if such
was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was
it

§ 18-309(1 ).
§ 18-309

of

for prejudgment time

concurrent incarceration

for an offense

other offenses or cases.

This second phrase is the only limit on the mandate that the district court give a
defendant credit for his time served. Owens, 158 Idaho at 4. As explained by

Court

in Owens:
a court
a defendant
states that a person "shall"
that a
"shall

receive

The legislature amended I.C. § 18-309 on March 25, 2015, effective July 1, 2015, to
add a second subsection relating to credit for "any period of incarceration served as a
condition of probation" under a withheld judgment or suspended sentence. Ch. 99, § 1,
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws 240, 240.
Legislature did not
here. Prior to the 2015 amendment, the last amendment to I.C. § 18-309 occurred in
1996. Ch. 168, § 1, 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 552,553.
7

7

a
on the fact that
the judgment was entered.
(second emphasis added). Thus, this condition "simply describes the type of
incarceration that a defendant gets credit for." Id. "[A]s long as the defendant's
prejudgment jail time was for 'the offense' the defendant was convicted of and
sentenced for, the court gives the defendant that credit." Id. If this condition is met, the
statute "does not limit that credit in any way." Id.
Based on the statute's plain language, Mr. Brand is entitled to credit for his
prejudgment incarceration for the grand theft offense. The district court must give
Mr. Brand that credit "as long as [his] prejudgment jail time was for 'the offense' the
for." Id. Mr. Brand was in custody for the

defendant was convicted
from
to the time he was

was served

the

warrant on

on May 12, 2015. (R., pp.8-9, 73.) Even though

Brand was already incarcerated for other offenses during this time, the fact remains
that Mr. Brand was incarcerated for "the offense" of grand theft after he was served with
the arrest warrant. I.C. § 18-309(1 ). Nothing in the plain language of the statute calls for
the modification this condition when the defendant is already or concurrently
incarcerated for other offenses or cases.
Certainly, the legislature could have further conditioned the receipt of credit in
circumstances when other concurrent incarcerations exist. In Owens, for example, the
Court addressed the question of whether a defendant convicted of multiple counts and
sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment received credit for prejudgment
8

on

1

on
limitation on the receipt
unambiguous

language:

the

credit would

an alteration
credit

legislature

incarceration for 'each case' or another description other than 'the offense,' the outcome
would be different." Id.

4. The same principle applies here. Another description other

than "the offense" could have limited credit in circumstances

multiple offenses or

cases contribute to the defendant's prejudgment incarceration. For instance, the
legislature could have limited the credit to be awarded on only

original or first

offense causing the defendant's incarceration. But the legislature has not placed such
limitations in the statute. Instead, the only condition is that
offense,"

of any

or
plain language

defendant is incarcerated
or concurrent

factor such as
cases.

that the

§ 18-309(1 ),

I.

read additional language into

limit a

statute to

defendant's receipt of credit The Court of Appeals has interpreted the "offense"
condition in LC.§ 18-309(1) as follows:
The statute's phrase "if such incarceration was for the offense or an
included offense for which the judgment was entered" means that
right
to credit is conferred only if the prejudgment incarceration is a
consequence of or attributable to the charge or conduct for which the
sentence is imposed. State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850 (Ct. App. 1993);
State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 765 (Ct App. 1989). Thus, there must be a
causal effect between the offense and the incarceration in order for the
incarceration to be "for" the offense, as the term is used in I.C. § 18-309.

State v.

142 Idaho 67, 68

2005).

Appeals has held, "[T]he standard that determines entitlement to
9

of

for presentence

was

if

is one

1

is

1
Through this causal effect test, the Court of Appeals

added another condition

determination of credit for prejudgment time served, which is in conflict with the
plain language of the statute. The Court of Appeals examines not only if the offense
causes the prejudgment incarceration, but also if the offense is the original or exclusive
cause of the prejudgment incarceration. For example, in Vasquez, the Court of Appeals
that the defendant was not entitled to credit in a case arising out of Washington
County because he was already serving time in Payette County on unrelated charges
when he was served with the Washington County arrest warrant. 142 Idaho at 68-69.
Due to the concurrent Payette County incarceration, the Court of Appeals concluded,
Washington charges, therefore, had no

arising in Payette County." Id. at 68.

was already subject to
Court of Appeals has

upon Vasquez's liberty because he

similarly in Hom, 1

Idaho at 850-51 (no credit when

being detained as a consequence of charges in other counties");
State v. Dorr, 120 Idaho 441, 443-45 (Ct App. 1991) (no credit when defendants

already in custody and serving sentence for federal crimes); and Hale, 116 Idaho at 765
(no credit for defendant's original offense when defendant arrested for second,
unrelated offense but unable to post bond in either case). As evidenced by these cases,
the Court of Appeals' causal effect test does much more than ask if the defendant's
prejudgment incarceration was "for the offense ... for which the judgment was entered."
LC. § 18-309(1). The Court of Appeals' test requires that the defendant's prejudgment
incarceration was originaliy or exclusively for that offense Under the Court of Appeals'
10

or

§ 1

limit credit in
The

language. Owens, 1

provided in the

only condition on credit is that the defendant is incarcerated for "the offense." I.C. § 18309(1 ).

is no mention of

condition in statute,

as

of

consecutive or concurrent sentences, multiple counts, or multiple cases. Thus,
Brand contends that the Court of Appeals has gone beyond the plain language of
statute to improperly restrict

mandatory

of credit.

Owens, 158 Idaho

§ 18-309 in State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351

4-6 (rejecting the interpretation of I.

App. 1983), which had "incorrectly looked at legislative intent" to interpret the
unambiguous language

; see

Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/

, 151
legislature in
The

of

in other cases does not limit the

of credit for time

because there is only one condition in the statute: that

defendant's prejudgment jail time was for

offense' the defendant was convicted

of and sentenced for." Owens, 158 Idaho at

The plain, unambiguous language of

§ 18-309(1) mandates credit for "any period of incarceration" if

simple condition

is met. Owens, 158 Idaho at 4 (citing I.C. § 18-309(1)). Following the service of an
arrest warrant
theft.

i

grand theft, Mr. Brand was incarcerated "for the offense" of grand

§ 18-309(1 ). Pursuant to this plain, unambiguous language of I.C. § 18-

11

),

was

CONCLUSION
Mr.
his

respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court's order

for

for time and

this case with instructions to the

district court to award Mr. Brand 190 days of credit for his prejudgment incarceration.
DATED this 171h day of December, 2015.
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